How to Hire a Close Protection Officer — A Principal's Due Diligence Guide

Hiring a close protection officer or a close protection firm is one of the few procurement decisions where the consequences of a poor choice may not become apparent until a serious incident occurs. Unlike a bad IT provider or a poor-quality supplier, a protection firm that is not what it claims to be creates a specific and serious risk: the principal believes they are protected when they are not. This guide is written for principals, chiefs of staff, and family office directors conducting due diligence on close protection providers.

Verify the licence, not the claim

In most jurisdictions, private security operators require a licence to operate legally. In the UK, this is the SIA (Security Industry Authority) licence. In France, CNAPS (Conseil National des Activités Privées de Sécurité) authorization is required. In the UAE, a SIRA licence is required for Dubai-based operators. Many firms and individuals operate without the appropriate licences, or with licences that do not cover the specific activities they are performing. The first verification step for any potential close protection provider is to request the relevant licence numbers and verify them directly with the issuing authority — not through the firm itself.

Background check the company, not just the officer

Individuals presenting themselves as ex-SAS, ex-GIGN, ex-Delta Force are extremely common in the close protection market. The legitimate ones do exist — they are a small minority of the total. A verifiable service history cannot be confirmed in most cases (former special forces operatives are correctly reluctant to confirm classified service details), but several indicators are reliable: the officer's conduct and knowledge during an interview reveals whether their claimed training background is real; references from verifiable past mandates (not from other security firms) are more valuable than claimed special forces credentials; and the firm's own history — how long it has been operating, whether it has faced regulatory action, who owns it — is verifiable through company registry searches.

The vetting question: who is in your home

A close protection officer has access to the principal's residence, travel schedule, family structure, health information, and daily routine — information that is extraordinarily valuable to anyone with hostile intent towards the principal. The vetting standard for a close protection officer should be significantly higher than for a typical domestic employee. FFGR conducts a five-level vetting process: enhanced Disclosure and Barring Service (or equivalent), seven-year employment verification, financial background check, social media and open-source review, and character references from verifiable individuals who are not employed in the security sector. Any provider that is unable to describe their vetting process in specific detail, or that positions vetting as unnecessary or excessive, should be removed from consideration.

What a legitimate close protection firm will not do

A genuine close protection firm will not guarantee confidentiality using social media posts showcasing past clients. It will not provide a portfolio of named client references that can be called without client permission (any reference provided should be cleared in advance by the client). It will not send an officer to meet a potential client before the firm has conducted basic due diligence on the client — legitimate firms protect themselves and their existing clients by screening new business. It will not offer to provide services that require regulatory approval it does not hold. If any of these occur during an engagement with a potential provider, treat them as disqualifying signals.

The practical question: will they be invisible

The most underweighted factor in close protection procurement is discretion. A protection officer who draws attention is more damaging than no protection at all: they advertise that the principal is protected, which signals that the principal is wealthy enough to require protection, which makes them a more attractive target for any form of criminal approach. FFGR assesses officer discretion as a core competency — how an officer presents in civilian environments, how they conduct themselves in hotels and restaurants, whether they conduct close protection in a way that is observationally indistinguishable from a high-quality assistant or personal advisor. This is hard to assess from a CV. It requires a trial period in a controlled environment or a referral from a trusted source who has observed the officer in a principal-facing role.